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Abstract
As of February 2015, over 622,000 Syrians had registered with 
UNHCR in Jordan. The protracted nature of the Syrian crisis has 
been dramatic: both the Syrian refugees themselves and the host 
communities in Jordan are paying a high price. Further political 
and economic deterioration may follow as the number of refugees 
is simply too great for Jordan to deal with. The EU and its member 
states have been actively involved in responding to the Syrian crisis 
both in political and humanitarian terms. The European approach 
has primarily consisted in providing support to the countries 
bordering Syria, in order to contain the crisis within the Middle 
East. However, as of 2014 and early 2015, worrying changes in the 
Jordanian Government’s attitude towards Syrian refugees show how 
such an approach is becoming unsustainable.
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Introduction
“Syria has become the great tragedy of this century”, 
says UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António 
Guterres, “a disgraceful humanitarian calamity with 
suffering and displacement unparalleled in recent 
history.” Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, 
it is estimated that almost 4 million people have fled 
seeking refuge in neighbouring countries: Lebanon, 
Iraq, Turkey and Jordan1.
As of February 2015, over 622,000 Syrians had regis-
tered with UNHCR in Jordan2.  The large influx of 
refugees over almost five years has had a serious 
impact on what were already meagre national 
resources. According to the Jordanian Economic 
and Social Council, the Syrian crisis cost the country 
US$1.2 billion, and the financial burden is expected 
to rise to $4.2 billion by 20163.  Jordan’s international 
trade has been gravely affected by the loss of one of the 
principal points of access to regional trade through 
Syria. A recent study reveals that the Syrian crisis 
has had a particular negative impact on Jordanian 
structural vulnerabilities. The influx of refugees has 
increased intolerably the demand on school, sanita-
tion, housing, food, energy and water. In particular, 
the arrival of Syrian refugees seems to have had a 
negative impact on Jordan’s housing sector. Rent 
prices have tripled or even quadrupled in border 
zones and other areas of high refugee density. As the 
majority of Syrians do not live in camps, this rise can 
be explained by the sharp increase in demand for 
housing and by refugees’ capacity to afford higher 
prices by sharing housing with others to bring down 
costs4. It should be noted, however, that while rents 
continue to increase for both Jordanians and Syrians, 
the former tend to pay higher sums than Jordanian 
households5. 
1 This paper is largely based on the author’s field research in 
Jordan (May 2012 to December 2014).
2 UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.
php?id=107[Accessed: 6 February 2015]. note these numbers 
are total ‘persons of concern’.
The protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and its 
negative, real or perceived, impact on the living 
conditions of Jordanians has meant that Jorda-
nians, who, at first, welcomed refugees, have become 
hostile: those who were originally dyuf (guests) are 
now laji’in (refugees). The belief that refugees are 
thriving on scarce local resources is widespread 
amongst an increasingly resentful host community. 
The job market constitutes a clear point of friction. 
Principally due to prohibitive costs and adminis-
trative obstacles, work permits for Syrians are not 
being issued. Non-Jordanians with legal residency 
and valid passports can obtain work permits only if 
the prospective employer pays a fee and shows that 
the job requires experience or skills not to be found 
among the Jordanian population. A recent UNHCR 
survey reports that only 1% of visited refugee house-
holds had a member with a work permit in Jordan6. 
However, despite the official restrictions on working, 
many refugees work informally. Jordanians often 
perceive Syrians as competitors for jobs7.  This has 
sparked protests and tensions between refugees and 
host communities.
3Al-Kilani, K. 2014. A duty and a burden on Jordan, Forced 
Migration Review, 47, September, http://www.fmreview.org/
syria/alkilani#_edn2  [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
4 REACH, 2014. Evaluating the Effect of the Syrian Refugee 
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Further political and economic deterioration may 
follow as the number of refugees is simply too great for 
Jordan to handle. Both Syrian refugees and the host 
communities in Jordan are now paying a high price. 
The EU and its member states have been actively 
involved in responding to the Syrian crisis at the 
political and humanitarian level. The EU approach 
has primarily consisted in providing support to the 
countries neighbouring Syria in order to contain the 
crisis within the Middle East. However, as of 2014 
and early 2015, a number of worrying trends in 
the Jordanian Government’s attitude toward Syrian 
refugees show how such an approach is becoming 
unsustainable.
Open borders?
The Jordanian government has often been praised 
for its open-border policy and humanitarian stance 
towards Syrian refugees8.  Since the beginning of 
the crisis, Jordan has received a massive number 
of Syrian refugees (see figure 1&table 1). This large 
influx has been facilitated by several factors such as 
refugees’ kinship and friendship ties in Jordan, the 
political stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, and 
the historically tight cultural and geographical rela-
tionship between the two countries9.  
That said, little information is available on the way 
Syrians cross the border, the criteria for access, and how 
the kingdom manages the informal border crossing. 
5According to CARE International, “Shelter is reported as the 
single most pressing need. The average rental expenditure is 
JOD 166. Syrian households on average pay JOD 193 for rent, 
indicating a 28% increase from the baseline data for urban 
areas outside of Amman. Jordanians report lower monthly 
rental expenditure (JOD 107).” CARE, 2014. Lives Unseen: Ur-
ban Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Host Communities Three 
Years into the Syria Crisis, http://www.care-international.org/
UploadDocument/files/CARE_Syrian%20refugee%20Assess-
ment%20in%20Jordan_April%202014(1).pdf [Accessed: 13 
February 2015], p. 8.
6 UNHCR, 2014. Living in the Shadow, http://www.unhcr.
org/54b685079.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2015], p. 28.
To reach Jordan, asylum seekers traverse a long and 
dangerous road, often across lines of fighting. Syrian 
refugees entering Jordan comes mainly from Dara’a, 
Aleppo and Homs and most arrived through the eastern 
border crossing. Many of the new arrivals are children 
and households with female heads (see figure 2). Refu-
gees accessing Jordan through formal border crossings 
are transported from the frontier to Raba’ al Sarhan (the 
transit centre managed jointly by the Jordanian govern-
ment and UNHCR). There they are registered with 
UNHCR and they are then transferred to one of several 
camps: Zaatari, Azraq, the Emirati-Jordanian Camp 
(EJC), King Hussein Park (KAP) and Cyber City.
 
7 A recent report published by ILO shows not only that unem-
ployment rates are not correlated with the areas of large influx 
of Syrian refugees, but also that Syrian refugees are mainly 
working  in jobs in the informal sector commonly performed 
by non-Jordanian migrant workers such as Egyptians – e.g. 
agriculture, construction, food service and retail. ILO, 2014. 
The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market 
in Jordan: Preliminary Analysis, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publica-
tion/wcms_242021.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2015], p. 14.
8 It must be remembered that the Kingdom is not a signatory 
state to the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. Jordan 
receives Syrian refugees within the framework of its Law of 
Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs (according to which Syrians 
are allowed to enter Jordan with their passport only, whereas 
visa and residency permit are not required) and it is subject to 
the principle of non-refoulement under customary law. Refu-
gees can receive temporary protection from UNHCR under 
the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
signed in 1998 with the Jordanian Ministry of Interior.
9 Olwan, M. and Shiyab. A. Forced Migration of Syrians to 
Jordan: An Exploratory Study, MPC Research Report 2012/06, 
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20
EN%2006.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2015], p. 1. 
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Throughout 2014, however, the daily arrival rate has 
steadily decreased. It seems that the government has 
drastically limited access to Jordan. UNHCR has 
claimed, on several occasions, that local authorities have 
refused to let Syrian refugees cross the border. Humani-
tarian organizations like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch have also reported several cases 
of refoulement of vulnerable Syrian refugees back to 
Syria in overt violation of international obligations10. 
All this seems to replicate a scenario already seen 
with Palestinian refugees from Syria. Prior to April 
2012, Palestinian refugees from Syria could enter the 
country following the same procedures applied to any 
other Syrian refugees. However, after that date, Jordan 
adopted a no-entry policy that has prevented refugees 
from crossing into Jordan and that has subjected those 
in the Kingdom to the risk of refoulement to Syria11. 
So far, Government authorities have been adamant 
in denying any change to the open-border policy. 
“There is no change in our open-border policy,” 
Mohammad Momani, Jordan’s information minister 
recently claimed. “Those who are injured, women 
and children continue to cross”12 . 
 10 SNAP, 2014. Regional Analysis for Syria Q3 2014, http://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/q-snap-ras-
quarterly-oct-2014.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
11 HRW, 2014. Not Welcome: Jordan’s Treatment of Palestinians 
Escaping Syriahttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
jordan0814_ForUPload_0.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
12 Sweis, R. 2014. No Syrians Are Allowed Into Jordan, New 
York Times, October8, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/
world/middleeast/syrian-refugees-jordan-border-united-
nations.html?_r=0 [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
Nonetheless, UNHCR and the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM) concur that no new 
arrivals of Syrian refugees have been recorded since 
early October – with the exception of a limited 
number of women, children, and civilians with 
urgent medical needs. This seems to be confirmed by 
the 43% increase in makeshift shelters on the Syrian 
side of the border from July to October 2014. It is also 
suggested by the recent clearing of the land between 
the Jordan-Syrian border where refugees used to 
be held for extensive screening before entering the 
country13. 
The increasing border restrictions may be explained 
by the fact that the influx of Syrians has strained 
Jordan’s already overburdened infrastructure 
and the Kingdom’s limited resources. However, 
Jordan’s participation in the United States-led mili-
tary campaign against the Islamic State and Jabhat 
Al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq is another likely cause 
behind the tightening of borders. Each strike of 
the coalition against the militants in Syria prompts 
fears of terrorist reprisals in Jordan by IS militants. 
Thousands of Jordanians have supposedly joined the 
ranks of the Al Nusra Front and IS14.
13 SNAP, 2014. Regional Analysis for Syria Q3 2014, p. 74.




[Accessed: 6 February 2015].
15 Su, A. 2014. Fade to black: Jordanian city Ma’an copes with 
Islamic State threat, Al-Jazeera, September 2, http://america.
aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/2/jordan-maan-daashthreat.
html [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
 16 The Jordan Times, 2014, Border guards kill infiltrator on 
Syrian border, Aug 19, http://jordantimes.com/border-guards-
kill-infiltrator-on-syrian-border [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
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Security forces have detained several suspects in 
the northern governorates for participation in 
pro-IS rallies 15. In addition, the government has 
reported a number of attempted infiltrations from 
the Syrian and Iraqi borders during the third quarter 
of 201416. According to Manar Rachwani, columnist 
at the independent Jordanian newspaper Al Ghad, 
“Tightening the border is a logical reaction from 
the government’s perspective, especially because 
the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s wing in Syria, is on its 
border, and [the Nusra Front] are being targeted by 
the U.S./Arab-led coalition”17. 
An encampment policy
Tightened restrictions for refugees trying to enter 
the Kingdom are also a side-effect of the new poli-
cies implemented by the Government of Jordan to 
curtail the ever-growing urban refugee community. 
Approximately 16% of the entire refugee registered 
population reside in the five official refugee camps, 
the largest of which (Zaatari camp) is home to over 
80,000 people18.  More than 520,000 of refugees live 
dispersed in host communities, concentrated around 
Jordanian urban centres, mostly in the central and 
northern governorates(see table 2). In north Jordan, 
the governorates of Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and 
Zarqa alone host more than the 70% of registered 
refugees outside the camps (see figure 3)19.  
17 Sweis, R. 2014. No Syrians Are Allowed Into Jordan, New 
York Times.
18 On 30 April, Azraq camp opened in the northern governo-
rate of Zarqa.Even though at full capacity it can accommodate 
around 130.000 refugees, the camp is nearly empty: the area’s 
harsh climate and the camp’s isolation from services and liveli-
hood opportunities have persuaded many refugees to abandon 
Azraq. Many people have also left the other camps due to a 
number of problems, mainly related to lack of security (par-
ticularly for women and girls) and inter-community tensions.
REACH, 2014. Informal Tented Settlements in Jordan: A Mul-
ti-Sector, Baseline Assessment, http://www.reach-initiative.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/REACH_UNICEF_ITS_
MS_AUGUST2014_FINAL.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2015].
Here, about 20% of refugees live in substandard 
accommodation, such as garages, chicken houses, 
and tents. In addition, a smaller number of refugees 
reside in informal tented settlements (ITS) spread 
through the country, often lacking basic services 
such as health, education, water and food. 
Although there are not exact figures on ITS in Jordan 
and their population, a recent assessment carried 
out by REACH in five governorates revealed that the 
number of ITS is on the rise: 7000 individuals as of 
June 201420. 
Since the second half of 2014 the Jordanian authori-
ties have progressively restrained Syrian refugees’ 
freedom of movement in urban areas. Refugees 
used to be able to register with UNHCR no matter 
the status of their documentation. The government 
has, since 14 July 2014, though instructed UNHCR 
to stop issuing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) 
to Syrian refugees that have left the camps without 
proper “bail out” documentation21.  Without a valid 
ASC, refugees cannot access UNHCR and its imple-
menting partners’ (IPs) services such as cash and food 
assistance. The certificate provides Syrian refugees 
with the proof of registration as a person of concern, 
as well as access to all UNHCR services in urban 
areas. Most importantly, however, the 14 July proce-
dure affects the services offered by the Jordanian 
government. The ASC is indispensable for obtaining 
Ministry of Interior (MoI) Service Card for refugee 
access to public health care and education services in 
host communities. According to trusted sources, the 
new policy has already affected many Syrian house-
holds, including those who left the camp long before 
the more strictly applied procedures.
19 UNHCR, 2015. Syria Regional Refugee Response, http://
data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 [Accessed: 
16 February 2015].
20 REACH, 2014. Informal Tented Settlements in Jordan.
 21 The “bail out” is the legal process by which the Jordanian 
authorities grant Syrian refugees the permission to leave 
camps and holding facilities. 
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The “14 July procedure” has come at a time when 
the government is more generally enforcing bail 
out procedures from camps. Formal bail out ap-
plications must be submitted to the Syrian Refugee 
Assistance Department (SRAD) by camp residents 
and requires a Jordanian sponsor, ostensibly some-
one over 35 years of age, married, with a stable job, 
no police record, and in a direct family relation 
with the applicant. This process has not changed 
since the institution of Zaatari camp in 2012. What 
has changed, however, is the stiffening of the rela-
tively flexible attitude previously held by the gov-
ernment toward those refugees who cannot com-
ply with all the requirements. As a matter of fact, 
proper bailout documentation seems very difficult 
to obtain. Since the opening of Azraq camp in April 
2014, the overwhelming majority of bailout applica-
tions have been denied by SRAD, which appears to 
have discretionary power in determining the num-
ber and type of applications to approve. 
It seems evident that the goal of the government 
is twofold: restricting refugees’ freedom of move-
ment in urban areas, while making it more compli-
cated for them to leave the camps. To enforce this 
new agenda, a “verification” exercise in urban areas 
has been announced and is currently being imple-
mented by the Jordanian government. Syrian refu-
gees are expected to present themselves to local 
police stations and go through a biometric scanning 
procedure. The objective of the urban verification 
exercise is to issue new MOI Cards to all Syrians 
residing outside of camps in Jordan and to return 
original Syrian documents to their owners22.   
22 Note that up to 2014, Jordanian authorities used to confis-
cate identification documents from Syrian refugees entering 
the Kindom.
23 SNAP, 2014. Regional Analysis for Syria Q3 2014, p. 74.
24 UNHCR, 2014.Health Sector Jordan. Monthly Re-
port, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.
php?id=7762[Accessed: 6 February 2015].
 25 SNAP, 2014. Regional Analysis for Syria Q3 2014, p. 77.
However, the real goal of the verification exercise 
remains unclear. The same verification, previously 
carried out in Zaatari Camp seems to have resulted 
in a number of forced returns to Syria. The current 
verification process is understandably creating anxi-
eties and fears of refoulement and deportation to 
camps among refugees living in host communities.
Implications
A bleak scenario is playing out against the back-
drop of the Jordanian government’s new policies. 
The encampment policy has affected most Syrian 
refugees in Jordan at three interrelated levels: it has 
shrunk the humanitarian space and raised consider-
able protection concerns; it has increased the number 
of ITS evections, refugee deportations to camps, and 
refoulement to Syria; and it has forced refugees into 
negative coping mechanisms. These developments 
are all the more worrying as resources are already 
declining. At the end of 2014, WFP announced a cut 
in food assistance and the danger that it would have 
to suspend its programme in urban areas for lack of 
funding23.  The Jordanian government interrupted, 
at almost the same time, the provision of free health 
care to Syrians24. 
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Humanitarian assistance is coming increasingly 
under the control of the Jordanian government with 
clear negative repercussions in terms of protection 
and services provision. Refugee assistance projects 
need to receive the authorization of the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). 
Long and not always clear, in procedural terms, 
approval mechanisms have hindered humani-
tarian organizations from delivering assistance and 
providing protection services. According to reli-
able sources, the government has also instructed 
humanitarian organizations to serve only refu-
gees with complete documentation. This request 
is currently preventing large numbers of refugees 
in host communities from accessing humanitarian 
services and has exposed them to a number of poten-
tial and actual protection issues, including arrest, 
exploitation, and limited access to basic services25. 
Humanitarian actors fear that those excluded may 
be the most vulnerable – households with female 
heads, children, elderly, disabled, and so on – who, 
for example, cannot afford the costs of an MOI card 
and/or have limited freedom of movement. More-
over, these restrictions have also negatively affected 
the level of trust toward UNHCR, INGOs and other 
stakeholders, which refugees now perceive as being 
in collusion with local authorities in implementing 
an encampment policy.
The number of cases of forced and voluntary return 
to Syria has also spiked in recent months. The 
Government of Jordan ensures that the principle of 
non-refoulement is consistently respected. However, 
international organizations concur that hundreds 
of Syrian refugees, including children, have been 
forcibly returned to Syria26.  This is clearly connected 
with an increasing trend of forced returns to camps 
for those found without proper documentation or 
working illegally. International organizations have 
also reported a growing number of ITS evictions 
over the past months. In June 2014, for example, 
around 1,300 Syrian refugees living in an ITS in the 
proximities of Amman, the capital of Jordan, were 
forcibly evicted and sent to Azraq camp27.  Also the 
number of voluntary returns to Syria has apparently 
been on the rise since the beginning of 2014. Little 
is known of what persuades refugees to embark on 
the dangerous journey back to Syria despite the 
many perils and the general lack of assistance there. 
Border restrictions and the consequent separation 
from family members who cannot come to Jordan 
might explain, in part, such a high rate of return. 
However, the complete motivations behind these 
returns remain unclear. Given the restrictive poli-
cies adopted by the government, many refugees have 
developed negative coping mechanisms.
26 SNAP, 2014. Regional Analysis for Syria Q4 2014, http://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/p-regional-
analysis-for-syria---part-b-host-countries-oct-dec-2014.pdf 
[Accessed: 19February 2015]. 
27 REACH, 2014. Informal Tented Settlements in Jordan.
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Refugee families have coped with the first years 
of displacement by liquidating the few assets that 
they were able to bring along with them, relying 
on humanitarian assistance and working, mostly 
illegally. However, these work and humanitarian 
“opportunities” decreased steadily in 2014 and 
almost disappeared toward the end of 2014. People 
have sold their personal assets in the context of 
their protracted displacement in Jordan; they have 
witnessed the drastic reduction of assistance within 
the progressive shrinking of the humanitarian 
space; and their already meagre chances of secur-
ing a decent job have been curtailed even further by 
the restrictions imposed on their freedom of move-
ment by the Jordanian authorities. Child labour, 
early marriage, restriction of movement, domestic 
violence as a consequence of increased stress, high 
level of debt are all on the rise. Overall, vulner-
ability is increasing, and to survive refugees have 
often to recur to negative coping mechanisms. An 
ILO study reports, for example, that close to half of 
the families have one working child28.  A previous 
UNWOMEN assessment reveals that 47% of house-
holds’ paid employment came from children29.
Syrian families have also been readier to resort to 
early marriage a practice often resorted to by some 
parts of the Syrian community to ensure a better 
economic and a safer space for their daughters30. 
 
28 ILO, 2014.Rapid Assessment on Child Labor in the Urban 
Informal Sector in Three Governorates of Jordan, http://www.
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/
documents/genericdocument/wcms_246207.pdf[Accessed: 
6 February 2015].Also note that many studies have shown 
how child labour amongst Syrian refugees is a widespread 
phenomenon, which is not perceived by local communities as 
being inherently negative. See, for example, UN Ponte Per…, 
2012. Comprehensive Assessment On Syrian Refugees Resid-
ing In The Community In Northern Jordan, http://reliefweb.
int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UPP%20COMPRE-
HENSIVE_ASSESSMENT_SYRIAN_REFUGEES_2012.pdf, 
[Accessed: 19 February 2015].
What could Europe do?
As the crisis enters its fifth year, the situation of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan has fallen off dramatically. 
In the words of Andrew Harper, UNHCR Repre-
sentative, “We are seeing Syrian refugees in Jordan 
having entered a downward spiral in terms of their 
ability to sustain themselves. We are concerned that 
this will deteriorate even further in 2015. We are all 
accountable for their protection and well-being.” 
In this context, Europe can certainly do something. 
To begin with, the EU can actively work against the 
shrinking of humanitarian space in Jordan. The 
official Jordanian policy of open borders has been 
undermined by the dramatic decrease in admissions 
after the 1st of October 2014. This has currently 
left many Syrians in serious humanitarian need in 
the no man’s land between countries and, has, very 
likely, increased the risk of trafficking and smug-
gling. The EU and its member states should use 
sustained diplomacy to encourage the Jordanian 
government to enact a genuine open-border policy 
and to respect the principle of non-refoulement. The 
EU should also ensure that humanitarian and devel-
opment actors are able to target the most vulnerable 
populations according to their needs without regard 
to their legal/administrative status. Concerns should 
be voiced about the Government of Jordan’s request 
to UNHCR and its implementing partners that they 
not provide assistance to unregistered refugees. 
29 UNWOMEN, 2013.Gender-based Violence and Child Pro-
tection among Syrian refugees in Jordan, with a focus on Early 
Marriage, http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/
attachments/sections/library/publications/2013/7/report-
web%20pdf.pdf%29[Accessed: 6 February 2015], p. 3. 
30 Note that Syrian refugees have also developed some positive 
coping strategies. One example is the relevance of commu-
nity support as one of the main sources of income for many 
households. Care, 2013.Syrian Refugees in urban Jordan 
report, https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.
php?id=1922[Accessed: 6 February 2].
However, notwithstanding the importance of advo-
cacy, the EU’s messages to the Government of Jordan 
are likely to remain unheard if not combined with 
the implementation of more durable solutions. The 
protracted Syrian civil war and the endless arrival of 
refugees threaten the stability of Jordan and further 
accentuate the extremely poor conditions of Syrian 
refugees and vulnerable hosting communities in the 
country. Jordanian infrastructure is sagging under 
pressure. Over 600,000 registered Syrian refugees 
now reside in the Kingdom – the equivalent of 10 
per cent of its entire population. The relationship 
between host communities and refugees is progres-
sively deteriorating. In order to reduce the pressure 
on Jordan and other countries bordering Syria, the 
number of refugees temporarily relocated or reset-
tled in EU member states needs to increase. 
In this sense, the EU response to the Syrian crisis 
has been inadequate. As of December 2014, Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt were hosting 95% 
of the overall refugee flow. With very few excep-
tions, EU member states have enacted a politics of 
containment by providing assistance to the countries 
bordering Syria and by reinforcing Europe’s borders. 
As a matter of fact, only a very small number of refu-
gees have found an abode in Europe. The amplifica-
tion of the flow of Syrian refugees to European coun-
tries after the outbreak of the civil war has actually 
ushered a progressive contraction of EU borders: 
the overall number of refugees accepted in Europe 
has dramatically fallen from 29.4 percent in 2011 
to 2.3 percent in 201331.  The response has not only 
been limited it has also been uneven. Out of the 28 
Member States, Sweden and Germany has pledged 
the vast majority of resettlement places for Syrian 
refugees. 
31 Fargues, P. 2014. Europe Must Take on its Share of the 
Syrian Refugee Burden, but How?, Migration Policy Centre, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29919/MPC_
PB_2014_01.pdf?sequence=3 [Accessed: 6 February 2015]
32 Amnesty International, 2015. Left Out in the Cold
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The remaining 26 EU countries have only offered 
5,105 resettlement places, which amounts to just 
0.13% of Syrian refugees in the main host countries32. 
Whilst providing significant humanitarian assistance 
for refugees in those countries is laudable, the EU 
policy of containment is dangerous as it threatens the 
stability of the countries bordering Syria. Moreover, 
the case of Jordan clearly demonstrates that open 
border policy can easily become a mere rhetorical 
device which a country can use for domestic priori-
ties: for example, to secure the conspicuous flux of 
money channelled through humanitarian aid. Para-
doxically, European countries can enforce a genuine 
open-border policy only by accepting more refugees 
currently hosted in Jordan in Europe – and helping 
Jordan to scale down its burden. In this context, 
European countries should implement a range of 
measures largely, but not only, centred on temporary 
protection: these are easier to implement than reset-
tlement and, thus, best suited to address the Syrian 
refugee emergency. As other studies have argued, 
this can be done by simply reinforcing pre-existing 
norms and policies: extending humanitarian admis-
sion/temporary protection regimes for refugees (not 
only Syrians) in the EU; expanding European coun-
tries’ resettlement programmes; exempting Syrian 
refugees from visa requirements; and by developing 
alternative legal routes for refugees, such as family 
reunification, university fellowships and scholar-
ships, training programmes, private sponsorships, 
and labour mobility33. 
33 For more, see Akram S. et al., Protecting Syrian Refugees: 
Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing, http://www.
bu.edu/law/central/jd/programs/clinics/international-human-
rights/documents/FINALFullReport.pdf [Accessed: 6 Febru-
ary 2015]; Fargues, P. 2014. Europe Must Take on its Share of 
the Syrian Refugee Burden, but How?; Orchard, C. and Miller, 
A. 2014. Protection in Europe for refugees from Syria, Refugee 
Studies Centre, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 10, http://
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/policy-briefing-series/
pb10-protection-europe-refugees-syria-2014.pdf [Accessed: 6 
February 2015].
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Obviously, not all Syrian refugees can find an abode 
in Europe: the displaced population is enormous. 
Fearing socio-cultural estrangement, refugees them-
selves may be unwilling to leave Jordan for an unfa-
miliar destination in Europe. As such, the EU and its 
member states need to continue supporting Jordan 
through specific programmes and funding schemes. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, EU has channelled 
428 million euro to Jordan through humanitarian, 
development, and budget support programmes. 
Moreover, in September 2014 the EU reaffirmed 
its commitment through the European Regional 
Protection Programme (RPP) and the Mobility 
Partnership34.  However, funding is expected to 
physiologically decrease as the crisis enters its fifth 
year. The EU should not only continue funding 
the response through multilateral and bilateral aid, 
it should also ensure a flexible use of funds for the 
whole range of interventions needed in Jordan: 
from lifesaving humanitarian actions to develop-
ment plans focusing on resilient and durable solu-
tions, including, crucially, livelihoods programmes 
for Syrians. The streamlining of humanitarian and 
development instruments is vital in building up 
neighbouring countries’ capacities to cope with
the crisis and the impact that this can have on the 
stability of the whole Middle Eastern region.  
Jordan is under severe strain. The massive influx 
of refugees has overstretched its infrastructure and 
has threatened its domestic stability. This has had a 
significant negative impact on the living conditions 
of Syrian refugees residing in the Kingdom. If the 
current situation is grim, the protraction of the civil 
conflict in Syria does not leave much room for hope 
in the future. For reasons of regional security and 
humanitarian aid there is an urgent need to work 
on a more durable solution to the refugee crisis in 
Jordan.
34 ENPI, 2014.EU pledges to step up partnership with Jordan 
amid devastating impact of violent conflict in the, http://enpi-
info.eu/medportal/news/latest/38663/EU-pledges-to-step-up-
partnership-with-Jordan-amid-devastating-impact-of-violent-
conflict-in-the-region [Accessed: 6 February 2015] 
Figure 1: Syrian registration trend in Jordan since 1 March 2011(24 January 2015)
Source: UNHCR
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Table 1:Syrian Arrival and Registration Trends in 
Jordan (24 January 2015)
Source: UNHCR
Table 2: Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan living 
inside/outside camps (as of 24 January 2015)
Source: UNHCR
  N. % 
Inside camps 100,382 16.2 
Outside camps 521,022 83.8 
Total 621,404 100.0 
 
Arrivals 
Year N. % 
Pre-
2011 9080 1.5 
2011 22588 3.6 
2012 186369 30.0 
2013 320062 51.5 
2014 82969 13.4 
2015 336 0.1 
Registration Trend 
Year N. % 
2011 2306 0.3 
2012 129896 14.1 
2013 666411 72.4 
2014 120569 13.1 
2015 1195 0.1 
 
Figure 2: Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan by age group and sex (as of 24 January 2015)
Source: UNHCR
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Figure 3: Geographical concentration of registered Syrian refugees living in hosting communities 
(colour does not include camps population) (24 January 2015)
Source: UNHCR
